Complementarities, information and coordination: the project aims at designing experiments to study how different types of strategic complementarity combined with different information conditions impact on coordination and efficiency in coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria.

Coordination and heterogeneity in minority games: the project studies processes of coordination and self-organization in large-group noncooperative games in which agents repeatedly compete to be on the minority side. Similar coordination problems are known in the experimental economics literature under the heading of "market entry games", of which the minority game can be seen as an extreme version. The project makes use of both computer simulations and laboratory experiments.

The impact of short term memory bounds on strategic behavior: the project aims at verifying through laboratory experiments the impact of short term memory bounds, here intended as a measurable proxy for information processing capacity limits, on some prototypical forms of strategic reasoning. The projects' goal is investigating whether such "hardwired" computational bounds account for part of the behavioral heterogeneity normally observed in experimental games.

Modularity, decomposability of problems and division of innovative labor (see also the Misc project): the project aims at designing experiments on decentralized problem solving in the presence of limited rationality and technological interdependencies. The goal is studying the technological and behavioral conditions that allow division of innovative labor and market-driven coordination in the presence of complexity.

New and old firms: the project, supported by the Province of Trento, is aimed at evaluating the role of the birth of new firms and the growth of the existing ones in explaining the patterns of industrial evolution.